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RECENT CASES
Conflict of Laws-Torts-Law of Jurisdiction with
Predominant Interest in Resolution of
Issue Applied
En route to California two members of plaintiff's family were killed
in a Missouri automobile collision with defendant, a California resident. Although the decedents' estates were being administered in
Ohio, which was their domicile at the time of the accident, plaintiffs
moved from Ohio to California and brought a wrongful death action
in the state court. The California Court of Appeals applied the traditional rule that the measure of damages recoverable in a wrongful
death action is determined by the place of the wrong; plaintiffs were
awarded the 25,000 dollar maximum allowed under Missouri law.
On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that since Ohio and California
had more substantial contacts with the parties and greater interest
in the outcome of the litigation, the laws of either of these states,
which place no limitation on wrongful death recoveries, should determine the measure of damages. The California Supreme Court, held,
reversed. The forum court should weigh the interests and policies of
each state, and the law of the jurisdiction having the predominant
interest in the resolution of each specific issue should be applied.
Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
The traditional choice-of-law rule in tort cases has been that the
law of the place of the wrong determines the substantive rights of
the parties.- Because this rule derived from the "vested rights" doctrine2 that the right to recover for a foreign tort owes its creation to
the law of the place where the injury occurred, it was assumed that
the laws of that same jurisdiction necessarily determined the extent
of liability. The "vested rights" theory and the view that the law of
1. RESTATEmENT oF CoNurFLis § 384 (1929). On the issue of measure of damages,
"[t]he law of the place of the wrong governs the amount of recovery for wrongful
death as well as the right to recover. Thus, any limitation upon the amount imposed
by the law of the place of the wrong will be applicable to determine the maximum
amount recoverable elsewhere." Id. § 391, comment d.
2. "The theory . . . is that although the act complained of was subject to no law
having force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation . . . which, like other obligations, follows the person, and may be enforced wherever the person may be found ....
But as the only source of this obligation is the law of the place of the act, it follows
that the law determines not merely the existence of the obligation, . . . but equally
determines its extent." Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904). The
erosion of this doctrine has been recognized in subsequent decisions. Richards v.
United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962), noted with approval the departures by state courts
discussed later in this comment.
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one jurisdiction controls all issues have been discredited by many
writers 3 who argue that choice of law problems should be resolved
by the law of the state having the most significant contacts with the
parties and the greatest interest in the outcome of a specific legal
issue. However, the courts have been slow to deviate from the traditional rule, which has the weight of precedent coupled with the
comforts of familiarity, predictability and ease of mechanical application. In the last two decades a few courts, with a variety of rationalizations, have refused to apply the law of the place of the tort when
to do so would have frustrated the policies of the state which had the
paramount interest in the resolution of the particular issue. Although
the concepts of "substantial contacts" and "predominant interest"
were implicit in these early decisions, such ideas were not articulated.
Instead courts employed language more familiar to choice of law
problems, such as "substantive" and "procedural." 4 Grant v. McAuliffe5
involved an Arizona car accident in which all parties were California
residents, and the tortfeasor's estate was being administered in California. To have applied Arizona (place of the tort) law would have
denied the action because Arizona allowed no survival of the cause
of action. Rather than defeat the interest of her citizens while advancing no interest of Arizona, the California Supreme Court characterized the issue as procedural and applied forum law, noting that
of the decedent's
"[b]asically the question is one of the administration
6 In Emery v. Emery7
proceeding."
local
purely
a
is
estate, which
members of a California family were injured while traveling in Idaho
when another member of the family lost control of the car. Idaho
law provided immunity from intrafamily tort liability; California law
did not. Because the incidents of the family relationships were
-established and regulated by the law of the family's domicile
(California), the California court applied California law rather
than the law of the place of the tort (Idaho) to determine
3. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 Harrv. L. REv. 173, 178
(1933); Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility,
58 HAav. L. REv. 361, 379-85 (1945); Cheatham and Reese, Choice of the Applicable
Law, 52 CoLUM. L. REv. 959 (1952); Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in
Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 267 (1966).
4. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary? 37 TExAs L. Rv. 657, 669-70
(1959).
5. 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
6. Id.
7. 45 Cal. 2d 421, 428, 289 P.2d 218, 223 (1955). "That state has the primary
responsibility for establishing and regulating the incidents of the family relationship
and it is the only state in which the parties can, by participation in the legislative
processes, effect a change in those incidents. Moreover, it is undesirable that the rights,
duties, disabilities, and immunities conferred or imposed by the family relationship
should constantly change as members of the family cross state boundaries during
temporary absences from their home." The same reasoning was applied in Haumschild
v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
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intrafamily immunity. In Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.8 a New
York domiciliary sued a Massachusetts corporation when a flight
originating in New York crashed in Massachusetts. The New York

court noted the place of the air crash was "entirely fortuitous," and
while it applied that portion of the Massachusetts wrongful death
statute which created the right of action, it refused to apply that
part of the statute which limited damages, on the ground that such
limitations were contrary to New York public policy.9 The landmark
case of Babcock v. Jackson'0 abandoned the subterfuge and concluded
that "[tihere is no reason why all issues arising out of a tort claim
must be resolved by reference to the law of the same jurisdiction.
Where the issue involves standards of conduct, it is more than likely

that it is the law of the place of the tort which will be controlling,
but the disposition of other issues must turn, as does the issue of the

standard of conduct itself, on the law of the jurisdiction which has
the strongest interest in the resolution of the particular issue presented." 1 The initial clarity of Babcock was clouded by subsequent
12
New York decisions. As in Babcock, all parties in Dym v. Gordon

were New York residents, and the car and insurance were based in
New York. However, the court, purporting to apply Babcock, chose

Colorado law (place of the auto accident) because the parties were
temporarily residing in Colorado and the guest-passenger relationship
originated there. Judge Fuld, who wrote the majority opinion in
Babcock, dissented in Dym, 13 arguing that while Colorado's contacts
8. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
9. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 912 (1963), held New York could constitutionally apply Massachusetts
wrongful death statute while disregarding the limitation of damages provision. The
court's language in Kilberg that the measure of damages was procedural rather than
substantive was subsequently repudiated. "It is open to us, therefore, particularly in
view of our own strong public policy as to death action damages, to treat the measure
of damages in this case as being a procedural or remedial question controlled by our
own State policies." Id. at 41-42, 172 N.E.2d at 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 137. However,
Davenport v. Webb, 11 N.Y.2d 392, 395, 183 N.E.2d 902, 904, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17, 20
(1962), said Kilberg "must be held merely to express this State's strong policy with
respect to limitations in wrongful death actions."
10. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
11. 12 N.Y.2d at 484, 191 N.E.2d at 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 752. Marshalling contacts for New York, the court noted the "injuries sustained by a New York guest as the
result of the negligence of a New York host in the operation of an automobile garaged,
licensed and undoubtedly insured in New York, in the course of a week-end journey
which began and was to end there. In sharp contrast, Ontario's sole relationship with
the occurrence is the purely adventitious circumstances that the accident occurred
there." 12 N.Y.2d at 482, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750. Although Ontario
law would control issues of conduct, the court reasoned Ontario had little interest
in the specific issue of guest statutes whose purpose was to prevent fraudulent collusive
actions by passengers against Ontario insurance companies.
12. 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
13. Chief Judge Desmond dissented separately on the "strong public policy" ground
of his Kilberg decision and Babcock. He explicitly rejected the concepts of "significant
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were "quantitatively greater" they were not "significant" .in relation
to the particular issue and underlying policy involved.14 The Babcock
approach of isolating issues and weighing contacts to determine which
jurisdiction has the strongest interest in the resolution of the particular
issue clearly calls for more discretion and analysis on the part of the
court. For this reason, although many courts have abandoned the
traditional rule, 15 many other jurisdictions have continued to consider
the place of the wrong controlling, regardless of the issue before the
court.' 6 The Tentative Draft of Restatement Second has adopted the

newer position, and sets forth guidelines or considerations to assist
in determining which state has the most significant contacts.' 7

contacts, "center of gravity," and "interests of the respective states" as "catchwords"
representing at best not methods or bases of decision but considerations to be
employed in setting up new rules of law required by the changing times" which
lacked the necessary guidance to aid lawyers in advising clients or courts in deciding
cases. Id. at 135, 209 N.E.2d at 801, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 475.
14. The purpose of Colorado's guest statute was to prevent fraudulent insurance
claims against Colorado companies. Since the insurance was based in New York,
New York's "strong and long-standing policy 'of requiring a tort-feasor to compensate his guest for injuries caused by his negligence" should have been given
effect. Id. at 131, 209 N.E.2d at 798, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 472. (Fuld, J., dissenting
opinion). The majority, on the other hand, found the policies underlying Colorado's
law threefold. In addition to the protection against fraudulent claims, it added the
prevention of suits by "ungrateful guests" and "the priority of injured parties in
other cars in the assets of the negligent driver." Id. at 124, 209 N.E.2d at 794, 262
N.Y.S.2d at 466. In Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d
591 (1966), the court reaffirmed Babcock. See Conflict of Spirit: Babcock v. Dym,
22 N.Y.U. L,rnA. L. REv. 119 (1967).
15. Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967); Wessling v.
Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967); Wartell v. Formusa, 34 III. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d
544 (1966); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Thompson v.
Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963); Casey v. Manson Constr. & Eng'r Co.,
428 P.2d 898 (Ore. 1967) (adopted newer approach but applied law of place of tort
because it had most significant contacts); Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1,
203 A.2d 796 (1964).
16. Coranson v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 345 F.2d 750 (6th Cir. 1965); Landers v.
Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966) (interspousal immunity); Friday v.
Smoot, 211 A.2d 594 (Del. 1965) (guest statute); McDaniel v. Sinn, 194 Kan. 625,
400 P.2d 1018 (1965) (measure of damages); White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223
A.2d 763 (1966) (guest statute); Cherokee Laboratories, Inc. v. Rogers, 398 P.2d
520 (Okla. 1965) (limitation of damages). Various reasons given for not applying the
newer rule included (1) the flexibility of the new involved gradations of contacts
as opposed to the certainty of the old, (2) such a basic change in the rights of litigants
should come from the legislature, (3) and the new would encourage litigation and
forum shopping in a sphere currently closed.
17. "(1) The local law of the state which has the most significant relationship with
the occurrence and with the parties determines their rights and liabilities in tort. (2)
Important contacts that the forum will consider in determining the state of most
significant relationship include: (a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the
place where the conduct occurred, (c) the domicile, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any,
between the parties is centered. (3) In determining the relative importance of the
contacts, the forum will consider the issues, the character of the tort, and the relevant
purposes of the tort rules of the interested states." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964).
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In Reich, the traditional rule would have required the application
of Missouri law to the issue of damages. Citing its prior decisions in
Grant and Emery, the court noted that previously it had refused to
apply the law of the place of the wrong when to do so would have
defeated the interests of the litigants and states concerned. The
court noted that because an increasing number of jurisdictions had
departed from applying the law of the place of the tort regardless of
the issue involved, the older rule no longer had the virtue of predictability claimed by the defendant. Moreover, "[e]ase of determining
applicable law and uniformity of rules of decision.., must be subordinated to the objective of proper choice of law in conflicts cases, i.e.,
to determine the law that most appropriately applies to the issue involved. " 18 It was from this background that the court analyzed the
interest of Missouri, the place of the wrong. The parties had stipulated liability, and the sole issue on appeal was the applicability of
Missouri's limitation statute. The court reasoned that while Missouri's
interests would control the resolution of issues dealing with conduct
within her borders, the limitation of damages for wrongful death was
directed toward the compensation of survivors and was not concerned
with conduct. Thus, when none of the parties was a resident of the
place of the wrong, that state had a minimal interest in the issue of
compensation. Although the court recognized that an additional purpose of Missouri's limitation on damages was the protection of excessive financial burden on the defendant, it labeled this interest primarily
local and found that Missouri would have no substantial interest in
extending the benefits of its limitation to out-of-state travelers. The
court reasoned that when no party involved resided in a state which
limited damages it could not be convincingly argued that a party
procured insurance with such limitation in mind. On the contrary,
it concluded that "a defendant cannot reasonably complain when compensatory damages are assessed in accordance with the law of his
domicile and the plaintiffs received no more than they would have had
they been injured at home."19 Having decided not to apply Missouri
law, the court could have stopped its analysis, because neither California nor Ohio limits recovery. It chose not to do so and proceeded
to determine which state had the predominant interest in the specific
issue before the court. Because of its lack of limitation California
had no interest in applying its law on behalf of the California resident-defendant. Furthermore, although the plaintiffs' present domicile
was California, their residence at the time of the accident was Ohio;
to prevent forum shopping, the court made it explicit that events
subsequent to the tort should have no impact on the choice of law.
18. 432 P.2d at 730, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
19. Id. at 731, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
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Having found Missouri's interests minimal and the forum disinterested
in the issue of damages, the court concluded that the interests of
Ohio were predominant and could be recognized in giving full recovery to the injured parties without disregarding any substantial
interest of the other states. Thus, the court reversed and awarded
plaintiffs 55,000 dollars.
The results in earlier cases such as Grant v. McAuliffe and Kilberg
v. Northeast Airlines were proper, but the reasoning was strained and
intellectually unsatisfactory. Unlike Grant, in which the California
court characterized survival of the action as procedural rather than
substantive and thus applied the law of the forum, the court in
Reich refused to base the decision on an ambiguous substantive-procedural dichotomy. Instead the court sought to resolve the conflict
by carefully analyzing the interest of each state in the issue of damages. The value of the decision will not be in the result-other courts
have reached comparable results2 0-but in its clarity.21 Perhaps benefitted by having the single issue of damages before it, the court outlined a process which may be utilized in future cases involving many
issues: (1) isolate the issues; (2) analyze the policies underlying the
local laws of the various states concerned; and (3) determine which
state has the predominant interest in the resolution of the particular
issue under consideration. Clearly this three-step process involves
more than the mere grouping or adding up of contacts; it necessitates an analysis of whether a contact has a significant relationship
to a particular issue. Dym v. Gordon indicated the New York court's
difficulty in applying the principles of Babcock and in reaching an
harmonious evaluation of the policy and interests of each state.
Through the use of the approach employed by Reich the contact
analysis principle can be applied with greater precision and clarity.

Constitutional Law-Owner of Private Subdivision
May Refuse To Sell to Negroes
Defendants,1 owners, developers and real estate agents of a private
subdivision built without state or federal assistance or financing, refused to sell a home to plaintiffs because the plaintiff-husband was a
20. See cases cited in note 15 supra.
21. The respect Chief Justice Traynor, who wrote the decision, commands both as
a conflicts scholar and judge will no doubt influence other jurisdictions to adopt the
newer contact-policy analysis approach.
1. The plaintiffs joined four defendants, an individual and three corporations which
are engaged in different managerial aspects of the subdivision: (1) the subdivision
developer and home builder; (2) the corporate real estate broker; (3) the country
club for use of the people in the subdivision.
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Negro. The three corporate defendants were chartered under the laws
of Missouri and the subdivision was afforded the normal protection
and conveniences of state and municipal laws and services.2 Plaintiffs
brought an action in federal district court alleging that defendants'
refusal to sell was a denial of their rights guaranteed under the
thirteenth3 and fourteenth amendments. 4 Plaintiffs further alleged a
violation of their right to buy property as declared in 42 U.S.C. section 1982.5 The district court dismissed the action and on appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, held, affirmed. An owner of a private subdivision who refuses to sell to a
Negro solely on the basis of race does not deny rights guaranteed
under the thirteenth or fourteenth amendments and does not violate
section 1982. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 379 F.2d 33 (8th Cir.
1967).
Section 1982, which was derived from the Civil Rights Act of
18666 and 1870,7 guarantees to all citizens the same rights to purchase and hold property as are enjoyed by white citizens. Whether
section 1982 establishes a right to purchase a specific piece of
property from an unwilling seller has not been determined by the
court; however, no such right existed for white citizens when the
Act of 1866 was passed.8 Although a district court has held that
section 1982 was intended to guarantee the rights of citizenship
under the thirteenth amendment on the grounds that a denial of
the right to buy or lease property imposes a prohibited "badge of
2. Among those listed by the court were: zoning and building codes, banking and
lending laws, approval of plans by county commission, metropolitan sewer services,
education of children in tax-supported school district, and gas and electric service
provided by state licensed utilities. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 379 F. 2d 33, 35.
Plaintiffs alleged that this municipal and state involvement was sufficient to constitute
"state action" under the fourteenth amendment.
3. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime . ..
shall exist within the United States. . . ." Section 2 contains an enabling clause.
4. Section 1. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privilege or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Section 5 contains an enabling clause.
5. "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold
and convey real and personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964).
6. Ch.31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1896).
7. Ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144 (1870). Section 18 specifically re-enacted the Act of
1866.
8.-Avins, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, The Civil Rights Bill of 1966, and the
Right to Buy Property, 40 S.CAL. L. REv. 274, 306 (1967); Robison, The Possibility
of a Frontal Assault on the State Action Concept, with Special Reference to the
Right To Purchase Real Property Guaranteed in 42 U.S.C. § 1982, 41 NomTa. DAM
LAw. 455, 464 (1966).

1968]

RECENT CASES

slavery" upon the individual, 9 the Supreme Court held in Hurd v.
Hodge ° that section 1982 applies under the fourteenth rather than
the thirteenth amendment. Since the Civil Rights Cases," the
Supreme Court has consistently held that state action is required to
invoke the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Thus, the application of the fourteenth amendment, independently,
or in conjunction with legislation such as section 1982, has traditionally depended upon the presence of state action. Although the
state action requirement has been severely attacked as not having
been intended by the framers of the fourteenth amendment 12 and as
a limitation imposed during the aftermath of the reconstruction
period,'13 the Court has refused to deny its necessity. However, in
order to maintain the viability of the fourteenth amendment, the
Court has pursued a broad interpretation of state action by holding
that the amendment does apply when there is "significant involvement" of the state in discriminatory situations. 14 While the mere act
of licensing a business or real estate agency has not been held to
constitute sufficient state action, 5 the Supreme Court has recently
held that a repeal by constitutional amendment of state statutes
9. United States v. Morris, 125 F. 322 (E.D. Ark. 1903); Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 35 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting opinion). See Avins, supra note 8, at
274-75, 292-95; Robison, supra note 8, at 466. Although the thirteenth amendment
does apply to individual acts of discrimination, there is no indication that in the
absence of congressional legislation, that the refusal to sell property to a Negro
violates the thirteenth amendment.
10. 334 U.S. 24, 32-33 (1948). See also Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330-31
(1926); Virginia v. lives, 100 U.S. 313, 333 (1880). Although § 1982 was passed
by Congress following the ratification of the thirteenth amendment and prior to the
formal proposal of the fourteenth amendment, it was re-enacted in 1870 after the
ratification of the fourteenth amendment.
11. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
12. Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the
Laws," 50 CoLum. L. R~v. 131, 162-63 (1950); Robison, supra note 8, at 460-65;
Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the "State Actionr" Limit on the Equal
Protection Guarantee, 66 CoLum. L. REv. 855, 869 (1966); St. Antione, Color Blindness But Not Myopia: A New Look at State Action, Equal Protection and "Private"
Racial Discrimination, 59 Micr. L. REv. 993, 995 (1961); Williams, The Twilight of
State Action, 41 TrXAS L. REv. 347, 348-49 (1963).
13. See Silard, supranote 12, at 856.
14. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (private trustees operating privately
owned park for public use); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963)
(state conviction of trespass where city ordinance requires segregated lunch counter);
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (restaurant in building
owned by state agency operated by private lessee is state action); Hurd v. Hodge,
334 U.S. 24 (1948) (§ 1982 does prohibit enforcement of restrictive covenant by D.C.
court); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (covenant in contract between buyer
and seller excluding future sale to Negroes does not violate fourteenth amendment,
but state enforcement of covenant is violation of the amendment).
15. However, for the view that a state-licensed real estate agency is affected with
a public interest and is required by the equal protection clause to act in a nondiscriminatory manner, see Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 386 (1967).
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prohibiting racial discrimination in the sale of real property, in effect
makes the right to discriminate a state policy and is unconstitutional
state action. 16 Section five of the fourteenth amendment empowers
Congress to enforce the provisions of the amendment by "appropriate
legislation." Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in the Civil Rights Cases,"
contended that Congress, acting under section five, was not limited
to counteracting state action. This view, which has received strong
support from writers 8 and increasing support in the Supreme Court, 19
would allow Congress to enact legislation to protect citizenship rights
and insure equal protection of the laws without regard to state action
or state inaction. Thus, if section 1982 were held to give a Negro the
right to buy a particular piece of property, it could possibly be held
to apply without regard to state action, since it was enacted under
section five.
In the instant case the court found that the re-enactment of the
Act of 1866 in 1870 and the Supreme Court's decision in Hurd v.
Hodge20 compelled an inferior court to apply section 1982 under the
fourteenth amendment. After a careful consideration of the recent
decisions barring discrimination under the commerce clause and suggestions that section five of the fourteenth amendment might permit
Congress to prohibit individual acts of discrimination, 2 ' the court
held that the Civil Rights Cases and subsequent decisions made the
state action requirement binding upon an inferior court.22 While
recognizing the Supreme Court's substantial extension of the state
action concept, the court regarded the state and local functions (i.e.,
licensing, recording of property transfers, zoning and normal municipal services) which were connected with defendants' activities
16. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), See also 20

VAND.

L. REV. 1346

(1967).
17. 109 U.S. 3, 54 (1883).
18. See Frank & Munro, supra note 12, at 167-68; St. Antione, supra note 12, at
995; Robison, supra note 8, at 461-65.
19. In a case involving conspiracies to deprive another of his rights, Mr. Justice
Clark said that there was no doubt § 5 empowers Congress to enact legislation which
would punish all conspiracies that interfere with fourteenth amendment rights, with
or without state action. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 762 (1966) (Clark,
J., concurring opinion, joined by Black & Fortas, J.J.). Since § 1 of the fourteenth
amendment guarantees that citizens be treated equally with respect to public accommodations, Congress could base Civil Rights Act of 1964 on § 5 of fourteenth amendment as well as upon the commerce clause. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 291 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring opinion).
20. 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
21. See cases cited note 19 supra.
22. The Court noted that recent opinions (e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745
(1966); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)) indicated a change of course in the Supreme Court. "Certainly the opinions in Guest
indicate that the reasoning of the Civil Rights Cases is in the process of re-evaluation,
if not overruling, and that a court may not need to stretch to find state action if
congressional legislation is present." 379 F.2d at 42.
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as involving only nondiscriminatory assistance, which was held to be
insufficient state action under the fourteenth amendment. The ,court
determined that section 1982 applied only under the fourteenth
amendment and not the thirteenth amendment. Due to its holding
that state action is required under the fourteenth amendment and
that the requisite state action was not present in the instant case,
the court did not reach the question of what substantive rights are
actually guaranteed under section 1982.
The present decision follows the traditional interpretation of the
application of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments and of the
reliance of section 1982 upon the fourteenth amendment. By granting plaintiffs' request for certiorari, 3 the United States Supreme Court
has agreed to re-examine these traditional concepts in their application to the instant, case. Should the Court choose to extend federal
constitutional protection into the area of racial discrimination in private housing, there are several alternative legal bases for reversal of
the decision. By applying section 1982 under the thirteenth amendment, the Court could find that this section prohibits private acts of
discrimination without regard to state action. Should the Court conclude that section 1982 cannot be applied under the thirteenth amendment, it will be squarely faced with either meeting or avoiding the
state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment. The Court
may find that either the licensing of a business (real estate agency)
affected with a public interest, or the city's regulation of and affording services to the subdivision is sufficient state action under the fourteenth amendment. 4 Such an application of the fourteenth amendment would prohibit the refusal to sell to a Negro on the basis of the
equal protection clause alone or in conjunction with section 1982.
On the other hand, by holding that section five of the fourteenth
amendment does not require state action, the Court could avoid a
determination as to whether state action exists in the present situation and find that section 1982, enacted under the enabling provision
of section five, prohibits the refusal to sell real property solely on the
basis of race. Likewise, it has been suggested that the state action
requirement mentioned in the second sentence of section one of the
fourteenth amendment was not intended to apply to the first sentence
on citizenship.2 Thus, by interpreting section 1982 as describing the
23. Cert. granted, 36 U.S.L.W. 3107 (U.S. Sept. 22, 1967) (No. 645).
24. The court could adopt Mr. Justice Douglas' view that licensing of a business
affected with a public interest is sufficient state action. See note 15 supra. Also, the
position of owner-developer of large subdivision is different from that of the individual
home owner.
25. See note 19 supra. For implications of the Guest case see 20 VAND. L. REv.
170 (1966).
26. Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 54 (1883), felt
that when enforcing the first sentence of § 1 granting citizenship, Congress is not
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rights of citizenship protected under the citizenship clause in section
one, the state action requirement may be avoided.
Of perhaps more importance than the technical rules which may
be used in determining plaintiffs' rights are the policy issues which
must be considered by the Supreme Court in the instant case. It is
submitted that the Court should view the problem of private racial
discrimination in housing in much the same manner as it approached
school segregation in Brown v. Board of Education.27 Applying that
approach to the instant case, the Court must consider housing discrimination in light of its full effect upon life in the United States
today. If the Court feels that housing discrimination is responsible
in large measure for the racial ghettos, city slums and segregated
suburbs, a problem which has led to increasing alienation of a large
portion of the Negroes in our society, and that this results in a
denial of equal protection of the law, then it should act to remedy
the situation unless there are other compelling factors which weigh
against this result. One of these countervailing factors is the traditional Anglo-American view of the sanctity of property and the
bundle of rights which an owner acquires. One of the most valued
property rights is the power to sell or not to sell to whomever the
property owner desires. However, our history shows that property
rights have generally yielded to regulation under the police power of
the city, state and national governments.2 8 Therefore it may be said
that to the extent that the refusal to sell property to a Negro is contrary to the general welfare, there is no property right which would
allow a denial of the Negro's civil rights. Another serious policy issue
is whether or not a reversal of the present decision under the fourteenth amendment would result in an infringement upon our federal
system of government under which the Constitution delegates certain
powers to the central government and reserves the remainder to the
states. If the Court reverses the present decision, it is entering into
an area of private law formerly reserved to the states. Such a decision
might have drastic implications in other areas of state law in which
a question of equal protection or due process might arise, and the
limited to legislation restricting state action. See also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 291-93 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
27. "In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the
Amendment was adopted . . . . We must consider public education in light of its
full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation. Only
in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these
plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 492-93 (1954).
28. "Property rights have been redefined in response to a swelling demand that
ownership be responsible and responsive to the needs of the social whole. Property
rights cannot be used as a shibboleth to cloak conduct which adversely affects the
health, the safety, the morals, or the welfare of others." Powell, The Relationship
Between Property Rights and Civil Rights, 15 HAsINGs L.J. 135, 149-50 (1963).
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removal of the state action requirement would presumably extend
federal constitutional protection to these areas. Another factor which
may weigh against judicial resolution of this problem is the possibility that Congress, under the commerce clause or section five of
the fourteenth amendment, might adopt a comprehensive plan which
would prevent racial discrimination in private housing and yet give
recognition to certain factors which would result in a more acceptable
and equitable result. However, recent developments indicate a Congressional reluctance to enact equal housing legislation, and this
hesitancy may prompt the Supreme Court to provide a judicial remedy. It is submitted that there is sufficient legal authority for either
an affirmance or reversal of the Eighth Circuit's opinion. In view of
the trend in recent cases involving racial discriminations and in light
of the previously mentioned political and social implications of segregated urban housing, it is submitted that the Supreme Court should
reverse the instant decision. The course of least resistance would be
to extend the state action doctrine to include state licensing of real
estate agencies. If the Court does not make this extension, it seems
that now is the time for a thorough re-evaluation of the state action
doctrine as set forth in the Civil Rights Cases.

Eminent Domain-Compensation for Substantial
Impairment of Riparian Owners' Right of
Access Denied
Plaintiffs were owners of shipyards at the upper end of a navigable
channel. After defendant, California Department of Public Works,'
proposed to build highway bridges over the channel which would
prevent a substantial proportion of the ships presently built at
plaintiffs' yards from reaching deep water 2 plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment establishing their right to compensation under the
eminent domain provision of the California constitution. 3 The trial
court held that the proposed impairment of plaintiffs' access would
29. See cases cited notes 14, 16 and 27 supra.
1. Hereinafter referred to as "state."
2. The proposed bridges would be 45 feet above the water line; one plaintiff alledged that 81% of his business involves ships standing more than 45 feet above the
waterline, and the other that such ships constitute 35% of his business. The channel
is the sole means of access to deep water from plaintiffs' shipyards, and thus construction of the bridges would effectively deprive plaintiffs of much of their business.
Colberg, Inc. v. State, 55 Cal. Rptr. 159 (Ct. App. 1966).
3. "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation .. " CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 14.
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not take or damage plaintiffs' property rights and granted the state's
motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court of appeals reversed,
holding that plaintiffs had an easement of access, the substantial
impairment of which would constitute compensable damage.4 On
appeal to the Supreme Court of California, held, reversed. The property rights of riparian owners on navigable waterways are subject to
the superior right of the state to use these waterways for the improvement of commerce and navigation, and their termination gives rise to
no compensable taking or damage. Colberg, Inc. v. State, 432 P.2d
3, 62 Cal. lRptr. 401 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
Although California,5 and almost every other state,6 holds that a
riparian owner has a right of access to the channel of the watercourse
on which the land is situated, it does not necessarily follow that this
right is a property right for which compensation is required when
taken or damaged for public use. With respect to navigable waterways, the federal power over navigation, by virtue of the commerce
clause of the Constitution, is superior to all other rights, and in the
proper exercise of this power the riparian owner's access may be
terminated without compensation.7 This power has been explained
as a dominant servitude, or dominant right, in the federal government,8 burdening all riparian rights from their inception, and its
exercise does not constitute a taking of private property. 9 The
states possess a like power over navigation, subject only to the
dominant federal right.10 However, while the dominant servitude of
the federal government rests only upon its power over navigation, the
states, as holders of their navigable waters in trust for their citizens,"
are not so confined; it is well within the powers of the state to "use
the waters in behalf of the public for any purpose to which it could
lawfully devote any other portion of the public domain." 12 Thus
4. Colberg, Inc. v. State, 55 Cal. Rptr. 159 (Ct. App. 1966).
5. San Francisco Say. Union v. R.G.R. Petroleum & Mining Co., 144 Cal. 134, 77
P. 823 (1904) (riparian owner has right of access against private interference);
Shirley v. Bishop, 67 Cal. 543, 8 P. 82 (1885) (right of access held a property
right and interference with it may be enjoined).
6. 2 AmEcAN LAW oF PnoPERTY § 9.48 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 2 H. TUFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY § 665 (3d ed. 1939).
7. Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900) (riparian owner held to have no right
to compensation for loss of access due to improvement in navigation); 2 P. Nxcnios,
E sn
m rr DoMAIN § 5.7914[1] (rev. 3d ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as NlcuoLs].
8. See, e.g., United States v. Willow River Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945); United States
v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., 312 U.S. 592 (1941); Lewis Blue Point Oyster
Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913). See also Comment, Federal Eminent
Domain Power in the Development of Water Projects, 50 YALE L.J. 668, 672 (1941).
9. Since the riparian owner takes his property subject to the servitude of the
government, when that servitude is exercised he loses no rights which he had before.
10. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); 2 Nicnors § 5.7914[2].
11. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
12. 2 Nicnos § 5.792, at 260.
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some states appear to recognize no private rights in connection with
navigable waters as superior to the state's right to use those waters

for any public purpose, 3 and in effect extend the dominant servitude
to its fullest limits. However, the great majority of the decided cases

limit the scope of the servitude to public actions connected with the
improvement of navigation.' 4 Yet, even those states which have
recognized the private right of access as superior to public uses not in
aid of navigation have consistently held that the right of access is to

the channel fronting the owner's land, and obstruction of passage
upstream or downstream deprives the riparian owner of the public
right of navigation only, for which no redress can be had.' In
California, the precise extent of the state's servitude had not been
decided prior to the present case. Several decisions spoke of the
state's power over navigable waters for the purposes of "commerce
and navigation," and suggested, without clearly holding, that the

scope of the servitude thus exceeded the traditional navigational
16
imits.

However, a line of California highway cases could be

construed to support a compensable private right of access. Just as

the riparian owner has a right of access to the channel fronting his
13. Lovejoy v. City of Norwalk, 112 Conn. 199, 152 A. 210 (1930) (property right
in oyster beds held subordinate to state's use of navigable water for sewage disposal);
Nelson v. De Long, 213 Minn. 425, 7 N.W.2d 342 (1942) (private riparian rights
held subordinate to public use of navigable waters for the "ordinary uses of life");
Crary v. State Highway Comm'n, 219 Miss. 284, 68 So. 2d 468 (1953) (private
riparian rights of maintaining oyster beds and bathing subordinate to paramount right
of public to construct highway bridge); Darling v. City of Newport News, 123 Va.
14, 96 S.E. 307 (1918) (public right to use navigable water for sewage disposal
superior to private right in oyster beds), aff'd, 249 U.S. 540 (1919); 2 NIcaoLs §
5.792.
14. 1 AmEIuCAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 9.48 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 2 NICHOLS §
5.792; 1 R. PowELL, REAL PnoPERTY ff 160 (1949); 2 H. TiFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §
665 (3d ed. 1939).
15. E.g., Moore v. State Rd. Dep't, 171 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1965); Frost v. Washington
County R.R., 96 Me. 76, 51 A. 806 (1901); Marine Air Ways, Inc. v. State, 201 Misc.
349, 104 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Ct. Cl. 1951); State ex rel. Andersons v. Masheter, 1 Ohio
St. 2d 11, 203 N.E.2d 325 (1964); 2 NiCHOLS § 5.79211]. Apparently only one case
has allowed recovery in such a situation. In re Construction of Walnut St. Bridge,
191 Pa. 153, reported sub. nom. Gumbes v. City of Philadelphia, 43 A. 88 (1899).
16. Several cases had also used the expression "for purposes of commerce, fisheries,
and navigation" when speaking of the nature of the trust in which the navigable
waters or tidelands were held. In all of the servitude cases, however, the factual
situation involved what was apparently actual improvement of navigation. In no
case did the word "commerce" appear to add to the scope of the dominant right of the
state. See City of Newport Beach v. Fager, 39 Cal. App. 2d 23, 102 P.2d 438 (1940)
(littoral owner held to have no right of access superior to state's right to fill tidelands for purpose of improving "commerce and navigation"); City of Long Beach v.
Lisenby, 175 Cal. 575, 166 P. 333 (1917) (dredging and improving harbor held
within public trust of "commerce and navigation"); Henry Dalton & Sons v. City of
Oakland, 168 Cal. 453, 143 P. 721 (1914) (harbor improvement held within paramount right of state to improve "commerce and navigation").
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land, distinct from the public right of navigation, 17 one whose land
abuts the public streets has a right of access to them, apart from
his right of passage along the streets as a member of the public.18
The total deprivation of the landowner's access, as by obstruction or
discontinuance of the street in front of the property for some public
purpose, is almost universally held to be a taking or damage of
private property requiring compensation under eminent domain provisions.19 Where some other portion of the street is obstructed or
discontinued, so that the land owner may still pass to the general
system of streets in one direction, but not in the other-the so-called
cul-de-sac situation-whether there is damage compensable under
eminent domain provisions is a point upon which there has been considerable disagreement. Although perhaps the weight of authority
denies recovery,20 a number of courts have allowed compensation,
usually upon a finding of injury different both in degree and kind from
that suffered by the general public 2 1 California, facing the cul-de-sac
issue for the first time in Bacich v. Board of Control of California,2
approached the problem from its most basic aspect. Reasoning that
in cases of first impression public policy should control, the court
weighed the underlying policy of eminent domain-the distribution of
loss from public improvements over all the people rather than the
individual-against the possibility that liberal granting of compensation might prevent beneficial public improvements, and held that
a substantial impairment of access should be compensated.23
In the instant case, the majority, after pointing out that plaintiffs'
claim to a private right of access went beyond traditional limits, declined to decide the scope of that right and rested its decision instead
on the concept of servitude. After reviewing the California decisions
17. See notes 6 & 15 supra.
18. See, e.g., People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Russel, 48 Cal. 2d 189,
195, 309 P.2d 10, 14 (1957); Wenton v. Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 78, 80, 138
N.E.2d 609, 611 (1956); McMoran v. State, 55 Wash. 2d 37, 345 P.2d 598 (1959).
See generally 3 NIcHoLs § 10.221[2]; Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy
and Concept, 42 CALiF. L. REv. 596, 643 (1954).
19. See 2 NicHoLs § 6.4443, at 577-78.
20. Id- § 6.4443[3], at 582.
21. See Knowles, Loss of Access: A Twentieth Century Enigma, 6 ST. Louis U.L.J.
204, 209 (1960). It has often been pointed out that the decisions are varied in reasoning and often conflict, even in the same jurisdiction. See Note, California and the
Right of Access, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 689, 690 (1965). For a collection of the cases,
generally sustaining the test of injury different in kind from that suffered by the public
as a whole, see Annot., 49 A.L.R. 330 (1927), supplemented by Annot., 93 A.L.R.
639 (1934).
22. 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943).
23. California, after appearing to have restricted the Bacich test for compensable
damage in a later decision, People v. Symons, 54 Cal. 2d 855, 357 P.2d 451, 9 Cal.
Rptr. 363 (1960), clearly reaffirmed it in two more recent cases. Breidert v. Southern
Pac. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 659, 394 P.2d 719, 39 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1964); Valenta v. County
of Los Angeles, 61 Cal. 2d 669, 394 P.2d 725, 39 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1964).
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concerning the state's power over navigable waters for the purposes of
commerce as well as navigation, the court reasoned that the servitude
of the state should be coextensive with that power, and determined
that the dominant servitude extended to public use of navigable
waters for the improvement of highway commerce. The court characterized the limitation of the servitude to public uses in aid of
navigation as an outmoded concept stemming "from a time when the
sole use of navigable waterways for purposes of commerce was that of
surface water transport," and emphasized that the demands of modern
commerce required the rejection of such a restriction.2 Stating that
its decision was supported by both the prior California law and sound
public policy, 5 the court dismissed the street access cases as not
truly analogous because of the underlying differences between private
rights in highways and in navigable waters.2 Thus, viewing the construction of highway bridges as an exercise of the dominant property
right of the state, the court held that no property was taken or
damaged, and that consequently plaintiffs were not entitled to compensation. The dissent stated that as there was no compelling precedent in the California decisions, the analogy of the highway cases
should be followed, and that if plaintiffs' right of access had in fact
been substantially impaired, public policy demanded they be com27
pensated.
The court's decision in the instant case was undoubtedly based
upon sound legal principles. The doctrine of dominant servitude in
respect to navigable waters is firmly established, and it is unques24. 432 P.2d at 12, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 410.

25. The court did not clearly state what this public policy was; apparently it
referred to the lower costs of public improvements made possible by not limiting
the scope of the servitude to public uses in aid of navigation.
26. The court stated that as the easement of access accorded abutting owners
arose from the historical development of roads as a means of providing access to the
land, the policies applicable in the highway access cases are not in point when navigable waters are involved. 432 P.2d at 13, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 411. This view of the
origin of the abutter's right of access is not clearly accurate, however. It appears,
in fact, to have been first recognized in this country in the late 1800's, in a series
of New York cases involving elevated railways. For a collection and examination of
the cases, see Sauer v. City of New York, 206 U.S. 536, 546-56 (1907). The underlying reasons for its development have been variously explained as the "land service"
concept, cited by the court, as judicial protection of the landowners reasonable expectations that his access would remain unimpaired, and as a combination of these and
other factors. See Comment, 3 ST.x. L. REv. 298, 299-300 (1951); Kratovil &
Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CALw. L. R!v. 596, 643 (1954);
Covey, Frontage Roads: To Compensate or Not To Compensate, 56 Nw. U.L. REv.
587, 596-97 (1961). Although certainly navigable waterways were not developed to
"service" the individual abutters land, it is quite likely that the other reasons equally
apply to riparian as to highway access, and even if not, the reasoning of the court in
Bacich was concerned not with the reason for recognition of the right, but with the
actual loss suffered by the destruction or impairment of access.
27. 432 P.2d at 15, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
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tioned that the states may decide for themselves the extent of that
servitude. In its decision, however, the court appears to have
repudiated the basic reasoning employed in the highway access cases.
The "sound public policy" that denied recovery to the plaintiffs in
the instant case seems to be only one side of the balance of policies
the court examined in Bacich. Although it is undoubtedly advantageous to the public as a whole to have the cost of public improvements reduced by denying compensation for injury to riparian
landowners, this ignores the other side of the policy conflict: the loss
sustained by the injured landowner. Whatever differences there may
be between the riparian and abutting landowner's rights of access,
the impairment of each results in injury to the landowner, an injury
which the B3acich court suggested was more appropriately shared by
the public than borne solely by the individual. In addition to recognition of the policy behind the eminent domain provision, the highway access cases provided a test to insure that in the individual case,
compensation would not be too liberally granted: by requiring substantial impairment of access before compensation is given, frivolous
claims which might unduly restrain the construction of beneficial
public improvements are prevented. The instant court, faced with
a choice of applying the liberal policy approach of Bacich or the
rigid no-compensation policy inherent in the dominant servitude concept, chose the latter. In the words of the dissent: "If [the court]
were right in the land access cases the majority are wrong in this
case."

Taxation-Professional Service CorporationsKintner Regulations Held Invalid
Taxpayer, a lawyer, acquired ten per cent of the outstanding capital
stock of his employer, Drexler and Wald Professional Company, an
association of attorneys incorporated under the laws of Colorado.'
On his federal income tax return for the year 1965, he reported as
self-employment income ten per cent of the corporation's net income
for the months during which he was a shareholder. 2 Contending that
28. Id. at 16, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
1. COLO. R. Civ. P. 265, COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 22 (Pern. Cum. Supp. 1965).
On December 5, 1961, the Colorado Supreme Court promulgated the rule permitting
professional service corporations organized under the general corporation statutes of
Colorado to conduct the practice of law. Drexler and Wald was incorporated on Dec.
29, 1961.
2. Taxpayer had been employed as a lawyer the entire year, but he was a shareholder only for the last two months. He appropriately reflected his salary payments
for the first ten months as salary income.
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the professional association should be regarded for federal tax purposes as a corporation rather than a partnership, the taxpayer then
filed a claim for refund of the tax paid on his 1965 return which was
attributable to the excess of the self-employment computation of income over the actual salary payments received as an employee of
the corporation during the months in question. The Commissioner
asserted that the taxpayer's employer more nearly resembled a partnership than a corporation when tested by the Kintner regulations, 3
and disallowed the refund on the basis that the taxpayer was accordingly a partner and not a salaried employee. On trial in the Federal
District Court for the District of Colorado, held, judgment for the taxpayer. The definitions of partnerships and corporations in the Internal
Revenue Code preclude the classification of incorporated professional
associations as partnerships for federal tax purposes, and Treasury
Regulation 301.7701 is invalid to the extent that it implies otherwise.
Empey v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1967).
For thirteen years the Internal Revenue Service has maintained a
policy in conflict with the courts over whether professional service
organizations may be accorded corporate status for federal income
tax purposes. Ironically, the judicial interpretation of this issue has
simply followed the precedent set by the successful argument of the
Commissioner in Pelton v. Commissioner,4 that an association of doctors operating a medical clinic should be held taxable as a corporation. The Commissioner was unable to overcome his Pelton argument
in the case of United States v. Kintner,5 even though under local
law a corporation could not practice medicine. The Commissioner's
contention that a state law prohibiting the practice of medicine by a
corporation precluded the classification of a medical association as a
corporation for federal tax purposes was likewise rejected in Gait v.
United States,6 which dealt with a factual situation in point with
Kintner. The Commissioner's defeat in these cases was followed by
3. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1965). These regulations required that a professional
service organization, even if incorporated under state law, is taxable as a corporation
only if it has sufficient corporate characteristics such that it more nearly resembles a
corporation than a partnership.
4. 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936), aff'g 32 B.T.A. 198 (1935).
5. 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954) (organization of doctors operating clinic taxable
as corporation).
6. 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959), appeal dismissed, 5th Cir., Nov. 24, 1959.
The original opinion in the Galt case contained no reference to any prior case, but
rather was "determined under the elementary principles of justice." Id at 361. The
taxpayer was also successful in the only other case that has dealt with this issue,
Foreman v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1964), where a similar unincorporated medical organization was held to be a Kintner association even though
a corporation could not practice medicine in Florida. The Commissioner chose neither
to appeal Foreman, nor to acquiesce. Eaton & Maycock, Final Professional Corporation Regs Are An Improvement-But Not Much, 22 J. TAXAION 208 (1965).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 21

non-acquiescence and the issuance in 1960 of the Kintner regulations,8 which severely limited the possibility of finding a corporate
resemblance for professional associations under the current state laws.

The Kintner regulations viewed a corporation as an organization in
which associates are united with an objective to carry on business
and divide the gains therefrom, while possessing continuity of life,
centralization of management, limited liability and free transferability
of interests.9 The existence of these "pure" corporate characteristics
was to be determined individually by the applicable state laws. 10
Federal tax classification was then gauged by combining these local
law determinations to require that "[ain organization will be treated
as an association if the corporate characteristics were such that the
organization more nearly resembles a corporation than a partnership
or trust."" These regulations were so designed to make it as diffi-

cult as possible for unincorporated organizations to be taxable as
corporations. 12 However, the Commissioner had not fully closed the
available remedies for tax-minded professional men,13 and there developed a movement to alter the federal tax complications by enacting state statutes that would enable professional associations to
7. Rev. Rul. 23, 1956-1 Ctr. BuLL. 598.
8. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2, T.D. 6503, 1960-2 Cum. BULL. 413. The term "Kintner regulations" is not intended to imply that they follow the philosophy of that case,
since in fact they repudiate the Kintner case, but rather it is the generally accepted
name used to describe this specific portion of the regulations. Lewis, Tax Treatment
of the Professional Association, 20 NAT. TAx. J. 227, 230 (1967).
9. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1960). Because "associates" and an "objective to
carry on a business for profit" are considered common to both partnerships and
corporations, the Treasury states that the crucial characteristics are the remaining four.
Id. at (a) (2). These six criteria are developed in Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296
U.S. 344 (1935), and since applied in Pelton v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir.
1936), and United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954), aff'g 107 F.
Supp. 976 (D. Mont. 1952).
10. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1960). Local law determines whether the required corporate characteristics are in fact possessed-and can be legally possessedby the organization in question. Snyder & Weckstein, Quasi-Corporations, QuasiEmployees, and Quasi-Tax Relief for Professional Persons, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 613,
656 (1963).
11. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1960) (emphasis added).
12. 272 F. Supp. 851, 852 (D. Colo. 1967); Sparber & Wolper, The Current Status
of Professional Corporations and Associations, 19 J. Am. Soc'y C.L.U. 197, 199 (1965);
Note, Professional Corporations and Associations, 75 HInv. L. REv. 776, 779 (1962).
13. In addition to the private law benefits inherent in the corporate characteristics
required by the Kintner regulations, there are specific tax advantages attached to
corporate status, such as: (1) Contributions to a profit-sharing plan for benefit of
"employees" of up to 15% of the employee's gross income ultimately would be returned with capital gains treatment. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 401(a). (2) Corporate employee can enter into a contract with the corporation to defer his income
and achieve effective leveling of income. Rev. Rul. 31, 1960-1 Cum. BuLL. 174.
(3) A tax-free $5,000 death benefit can be given to the widow of a corporate employee. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 101(b). (4) Tax-free accident and health programs are available. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 106. (5) Tax-free sickness and disability payments are also available. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 105.
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satisfy the corporate characteristics required by the new regulations.14
In response to this legislative movement, the Treasury amended the

Kintner regulations in 1965. These amendments deleted the example
found in the 1960 version which illustrated how seven doctors orga-

nized a tax-qualified association. 15 In addition, the Internal Revenue

Service practically nullified the effect of the new state laws by inserting several sections directed at the "inherently different" professional
16

corporations.

The court in the instant case interpreted the 1965 Kintner regulations as requiring that Drexler and Wald, even though formally incorporated, be taxed as a partnership unless its corporate characteristics were such that it more nearly resembled a corporation than
a partnership. This potential classification of an incorporated organization as a partnership was viewed as "inconsistent with the statutory
definitions" of partnerships 7 and corporations. 18 Since the definition
14. The final regulations were promulgated on November 15, 1960, only three
months before South Dakota enacted the first "professional corporation" statute, the
Medical Corporation Act, S.D. Laws 1961, ch. 29, on February 25, 1961. Comment,
Professional Associations and Professional Corporations, 16 Sw. L.J. 462, 466 n.29
(1962). Since that date 34 states have joined South Dakota
adopting similar
"enabling acts," and legislation is pending in 14 additional states.byLewis,
Tax Treatment of the Professional Association, 20 NAT. TAx J. 227 n.3 (1967).
15. Example 1, Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(g), T.D. 6503, 1960-2 Cum. BULL. 418,
deleted, T.D. 6797, 1965-1 Cum. BULL. 554. This example had served as a blueprint
for professional groups to qualify, so that in many cases the state statute's wording
followed Example 1. 6 P-H 1967 FED. TAx SFav. ff 60,405. The now-deleted'Example
1 contained substantially the facts of the Galt case. Lewis, supra note 8, at 230.
16. E.g. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1965). "[T]he law of a state authorizing
.a so-called professional service corporation . ..would not [classify] for purposes
of taxation .. .a 'corporation' merely because the organization was so labeled under
local law." Id. Also under a separate new subparagraph entitled "Classification of
professional service organizations," the Treasury implements this position by stating
that the "relations of the members of such an organization to each other as well as
.. . [to all others] are inherently different from the relationships characteristic of an
ordinary business corporation." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h)(1)(ii) (1965) (emphasis added). See also 272 F. Supp. 851, 852 (D. Colo. 1967). Thus the Treasury
proposed to ignore the state label and to test the organization by the same, if not
more stringent, standards. This attitude on the part of the Treasury was highly
criticized in legal literature even to the extent that several writers seriously recommended that the modified Kintner regulations be ignored on the basis of their patent
invalidity. Eaton, Professional Associations as Planning Techniques, N.Y.U. 24TH.
INST. ON FED. TAx. 671 (1966); Lewis, supra note 8; Sparber and Wolper, supra note
12. The Internal Revenue Service granted a general amnesty for the period up to
January 1, 1965, to allow all affected organizations to be classified as they had properly filed in Rev. Proc. 27, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 1017. This was interpreted by Eaton,
supra at 677, as a "tacit admission by the Service that the new [1965] Regulations
are an attempt at 'administrative legislation' and that under Kintner and prior regulations the Service had almost no chance in court."
17. "The term 'partnership' includes a syndicate, group ...
or other unincorporated
organization . . . which is not.., a trust or estate or a corporation......
INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, § 7701(a)(2) (emphasis added).
18. "The term 'corporation' includes associations, joint-stock companies, and insurance companies." INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7701(a) (3) (emphasis added).
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of "partnership" provided in the Internal Revenue Code refers only

to "unincorporated" organizations, then incorporated associations are

necessarily excluded. 19 "[N]either the statute nor the case law sup-

ports the Treasury's position"20 that professional organizations must
be taxed as partnerships and not as corporations. The court con-

cluded that the Kintner regulations are inconsistent with the statute
and that the regulations "constitute the exercise of a non-delegable

legislative function and are invalid and unenforceable." 21 Therefore,
Drexler and Wald was regarded as a corporation for federal income

tax purposes, and the taxpayer was entitled to the refund. The court
further asserted that even if it were assumed, arguendo, that the regulations were valid and enforceable, the corporate characteristics of
the instant organization were such that the test of corporate resemblance was satisfied. The Treasury's position that professional organizations cannot meet such a test was thus not only contrary to the
Pelton and Kintner cases, but also inconsistent with the facts as found

by the court here.22
The principal case is the first decision to interpret the amended

Kintner regulations and to deal with an actual professional corporation.23 The application of the Empey decision must be limited to
states which have permitted professional corporations, since only in
these states could an organization be "necessarily excluded" from

taxation as a partnership, even according to the broadest interpretation of this decision. 24 This emphasis upon the incorporation of the

organization is crucial, for the instant court regarded the state's
19. 272 F. Supp. 851, 853 (D. Colo. 1967). (Chilson, J., added that the Commissioner had cited no cases which construe such an inconsistency, nor did any legislative
history indicate a congressional intent to do so.)
20. Id. The court cited Pelton, Kintner and Galt with approval, and took judicial
notice of Congress' refusal to "repudiate this uniform and long-standing construction
of the statute." Id.
21. Id.
22. "Drexler and Wald has all the corporate characteristics of the associations in
Pelton and Kintner and in addition is an incorporated organization." Id. at 854.
23. The case of Foreman v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1964),
while in a professional corporation state, dealt with an association formed prior to
Florida's adoption of the statute. See note 6 supra. Pelton, Kintner and Galt similarly
dealt with unincorporated associations.
24. The nine states which merely authorize Kintner-type associations are Alabama,
Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and
Virginia. 5 P-H. 1967 FED. TAx SERv. fr 41,608. See Maier, Don't Confuse Kintnertype Associations with New Professional Corporations, 15 J. TAXATMON 248 (1961).
These states are soon to have their situation better defined in a case now pending in
a Georgia federal district court. This case was not identified by style at 6 P-H 1967
FED. TAx SEav. ff 60,405. For a lengthy analysis of the Georgia statute, in which the
law is said not to satisfy the test of the 1960 Kintner regulations, see Bittker, Professional Associations and Federal Income Taxation: Some Questions and Comments,
17 TAx L. REV. 1 (1961). Assuming the substantive validity of the 26 state professional corporation laws in effect, the Kintner regulations can be deemed effective
in the 24 remaining states regardless of the final disposition of the instant case.
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characterization of Drexler and Wald as a corporation under local
law as determinative of the association's federal tax status. This approach disregards the well-established distinction between the designation of an organization by a state for private law purposes and the
designation of an organization by the federal government for federal
tax purposes. Pelton, Kintner and Galt have all recognized the principle that state law is not controlling of federal tax questions by
explicitly rejecting the contention that the prohibition of such corporations by state law should control their federal tax classification.25
If to preserve the uniformity of application of federal tax law, a state
"can neither raise nor lower the federal taxes ...

by whatever name" 26

it chooses to label an organization, Drexler and Wald should not have
been accorded corporate tax treatment merely on the basis of the
label applied by the state. If, upon examination of the Colorado professional corporation statute and the professional corporation in question, the court could determine that, in substance, the organization
possessed the essential corporate characteristics, the state's determination of the status of the association should be sustained. However,
a thorough evaluation of the Drexler and Wald organization reveals
that there may be a legitimate doubt as to the existence of limited
liability and free transferability of interests. The Colorado Rule under
which Drexler and Wald was incorporated provides that all shareholders shall be "jointly and severally liable" except during periods
when the corporation maintains professional liability insurance 2 7 The
court found that Drexler and Wald did maintain the proper insurance
coverage2 8 and concluded that the nature of the liability of the shareholders was more similar to that of a corporate shareholder than of
a partner.2 9 However, the Kintner regulations provide that if a member remains personally liable under local law, limited liability would
not be present, notwithstanding an indemnification agreement.30 Moreover, the existence of free transferability of interests is also very
doubtful. The court passed over the fact that the shareholders' right
of transferability was restricted by the charter to transfers to the
corporation or to lawyers who are actively engaged in the practice of
law in the offices of the corporation. Certainly, a prohibition3 ' against
25. United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418, 422-24 (9th Cir. 1954); Pelton v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 473, 476 (7th Cir. 1936); Foreman v. United States, 232 F. Supp.
134, 136 (S.D. Fla. 1964); Galt v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 360, 362 (N.D. Tex.
1959); accord, Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932). See also Treas. Reg. §
301.7701-1(c) (1965).
26. Gait v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 360, 362 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
27. COLO. R. Cxv. P. 265(G), COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 22 (Perm. Cum. Supp.
1965).
28. 272 F. Supp. 851, 854 (D. Colo. 1967).
29. Id.
30. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d) (1965).
31. This should not be confused with the first-purchase option form of modified
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selling the stock except to a narrowly limited group is so substantial
a hindrance upon the free transferability of interests that the corporate characteristic does not exist under Treasury Regulation section 301.7701-2(h) (5) (1965). If one now applies the "more nearly
resembles" test to the instant organization, it seems that the absence
of free transferability, plus an unsure limited liability would make
Drexler and Wald taxable as a partnership.

Taxation-Recovered Charitable Contributions,
Previously Claimed as Deductions, Are
Gross Income In Year of Receipt
Plaintiff corporate taxpayer made charitable contributions of realty
in 1939 and 1940' and claimed federal income tax deductions on the
donations.2 In 1957, the donee reconveyed the property, and the taxpayer, characterizing the transaction as a nontaxable return of capital,
did not include the recovery in its 1957 gross income. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue viewed the transaction as giving rise to
taxable income and adjusted the plaintiff's gross income by adding
the total of the charitable contribution deductions previously claimed
and allowed.3 Plaintiff paid the resulting deficiency assessment and
filed a claim for refund of the difference between the assessment and
the original tax benefit,4 asserting that the assessment could not exceed
the tax benefit enjoyed. On decision by the United States Court of
Claims, held, refund denied. Recovered charitable contributions are
includable in gross income to the full amount of tax-saving deductions
previously claimed and allowed, and taxed at the current rate in the
year of recovery. Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381
F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
free transferability permitted by Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e) (2) (1965). The instant
contract was a further limitation beyond that form, which is also included in this
contract. Hence, the Colorado law itself might satisfy the regulations, but Drexler
and Wald eliminated all the transferability required.
1. The donations were subject to the condition that the property would be used
either for religious or educational purposes.
2. "'[C]haritable contribution' means a contribution or gift to or for the use of
A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation . . . organized and
....
INT. Ry. Cona.
operated exclusively for religious . . . or educational purposes ......
of 1954, § 170(c).
3. The deductions claimed in the instant case were $4,243.49 for 1939 and $4,463.44
for 1940. The tax rate was 24% in 1940, and 18% in 1939. The corporate tax rate
in 1957 was 52%, causing a deficiency assessment of $4,527.60 (.52 x $8,706.93).
The aggregate tax benefit for the deductions had been $1,877.49.
4. The alleged overpayment of taxes amounted to $2,650.11 ($4,527.60 minus
$1,877.49). See note 3 supra.
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The tax treatment of recovered deductions, especially those representing recovery of capital property, has long been a source of legal
conflict between the government and taxpayers. The government first

5
contended that all such recoveries must be treated as gross income.

However, the Board of Tax Appeals developed the Tax Benefit Rule
which limited includable recoveries to those representing previous
deductions which actually gave rise to a tax savings 7 while some
federal circuit courts continued to view all reconveyances of former
deductions as giving rise to gross income.8 Congress stepped into the

conflict with section 116 of the Revenue Act of 1942 (now section
111)9 which applied the judicially-developed Tax Benefit Rule to

three types of recoveries: bad debts, prior taxes and delinquency
amounts, and the following year the Supreme Court indicated that
the Tax Benefit Rule was not confined to the three statutory categories of the 1942 enactment. 10 This interpretation was subsequently
embodied in Treasury Regulations" which applied the rule to "all

5. Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296 (1946); Block v.
Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 338 (1939), aff'd sub nom. Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner,
111 F.2d 60 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 658 (1940). It has been held that
when the taxpayer once claimed a deduction which saved tax money by offsetting
income, he is estopped to deny its recovery is income. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v.
Rothensies, 43 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Pa. 1942). Another justification has been that the
taxpayer, when taking the deduction, impliedly consented that its recovery would be
treated as income. Helvering v. State-Planters Bank & Trust Co., 130 F.2d 44, 46
(4th Cir. 1942). "[T]he assertion is made that such debts, though ascertained to be
worthless and actually charged off on the taxpayer's books in a particular year, should
not be reflected in the computation of tax liability unless the deduction of the bad
debt actually reduces the taxpayer's taxable income. With this we can not agree."
Lake View Trust & Savings Bank, 27 B.T.A. 290, 292 (1932).
6. "Tax benefit" indicates that the tax deduction actually resulted in a tax savings.
This is the essential factor in the Tax Benefit Rule: all recoveries of previously
claimed tax deductions are included in gross income of the year of recovery to the
full extent of the tax benefit derived therefrom. For another view of the Tax Benefit
Rule, see I. T. 3172, 1938-1 Cum. BuLL. 150.
7. Amsco-Wire Prods. Corp., 44 B.T.A. 717 (1941) (cancellation of accrued salary).
8. "There is nothing in the regulation or in any statute which makes the inclusion
in gross income of collections of bad debts, previously charged off as worthless, dependent upon whether or not the charge off has resulted in a tax benefit to the
taxpayer." Helvering v. State-Planters Bank & Trust Co., 130 F.2d 44, 46 (4th Cir.
(1942); accord, Commissioner v. United States & Int'l Sec. Corp., 130 F.2d 894
(3d Cir. 1942). See Plumb, The Tax Benefit Rule Today, 57 HcAv.L. Rxv. 129, 133
(1943).
9. Ir. REv. CoDE of 1939, § 22(b)(12) (now INT, REv. CODE of 1954, § 111).
There is a limit to the amount of such recoveries which is includible in current gross
income. This restriction is the amount of the deduction claimed in the prior year which
did in that year and has since actually produced a tax benefit. The technical term for
this boundary is the "recovery exclusion." See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 111(b) (4).
10. "A specific statutory exception was necessary in bad debt cases only because
the courts reversed the Tax Court and established as matter of law a 'theoretically
proper' rule which distorted the taxpayer's income [i.e. taxation of a recovery though
no benefit may have been obtained through its earlier deduction]." Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 506 (1943).
11. T.D. 5454, 1945 Cum. BULL. 68, as amended, Treas. Reg. § 1.111-1 (1956).
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other losses, expenditures, and accruals" which had at one time been
claimed as deductions from income. Although deciding that only
tax benefit recoveries would be includable in gross income, these
developments left unresolved the problem of whether the recoveries
would be taxed at the rate applicable in the year of the deduction or
the current rate in the year of recovery. The problem can be viewed
as a conflict between an "annualization" and a "transactionar' approach by taxation. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co.12 favored the
concept of accounting for expense and income on an annual basis as
being the most practical in producing a regular flow of income to the
government and in establishing feasible methods of accounting, assessment, and collection. Under this approach: "[E]ach taxable year
must be regarded as an independent unit for income tax purposes." 13
The "transactional" approach"would permit tax accounting to determine income with a recognition that some commercial transactions
stretch over several years but result in a payment in only one year.
Therefore, tax considerations should not be confined to the boundaries
of a single year.14 The Court of Claims, in Perry v. United States,'5
seemed to follow the transactional approach. Stating that it was
The Dobson case and Treasury Regulation § 1.111-1 indicate that the tax benefit
statute did not include all of the categories of recovery to which the judge-made rule
applied. However, they left unanswered questions as to whether all provisions of the
statutory Tax Benefit Rule were present in the judge-made rule. For instance, the
statute would include in taxable income only that part of the deduction which had
caused a tax savings. Under the judges' rule, it was not clear whether, if only a part
of the deduction caused a tax savings, the entire recovery would be income. It
could be important in a lcase where, in a loss year, the total deductions exceeded
income. If the subject of the deduction were not one of the three listed in § 111
and if only a small amount of the deduction were to cause a tax savings, would the
entire recovery be included in income? A case decided under the judicially-designed
rule seven months before the 1942 statutory rule was enacted seems to indicate that
the recovery would be taxed only to the extent of benefit derived. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank v. Rothensies, 43 F. Supp. 923, 926 (E.D. Pa. 1942). Yet, when the
Board of Tax Appeals presented this proposition, the Fourth Circuit overruled it.
Helvering v. State-Planters Bank & Trust Co., 130 F.2d 44, 45 (4th Cir. 1942). The
instant case dealt with a deduction which had caused full tax benefit, but dictum
in the opinion seemed to indicate that if any tax saving was obtained, the extent is
unimportant. The entire recovery will be taxed. Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United
States, 381 F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967). Such a ruling would seem to defeat the equitable
purpose of the Tax Benefit Rule, under both its judicial and statutory development,
which was to limit the general rule of taxing all recovered deductions regardless of
benefit derived.
12. 282 U.S. 359, 365-66 (1931). Taxpayer failed to utilize two existing code
methods to reflect net profit or loss from a long-term contract. Expenses were not
permitted to off-set a judgment awarded under the contract in a later year.
13. Helvering v. State-Planters Bank & Trust Co., 130 F.2d 44, 46 (4th Cir. 1942).
14. 8 Duc L.J. 151 (1959).
15. 160 F. Supp. 270 (Ct. Cl. 1958). The facts were nearly identical to the
instant case. In 1944-48 the taxpayers had donated funds to a city for an addition
to its library. They deducted accordingly from their gross income and received full
tax benefits. In 1953 the city returned the total funds. Taxpayers did not include
recovery in their gross incomes.
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"inequitable" to require taxpayers to pay more upon recovery than
the tax benefit derived from the charitable deduction. In Perry, the
taxpayers were directed to exclude the recovery from their gross
income and to add to their current income tax the amount by which
their taxes had been previously reduced due to the deductions. Thus
the court achieved the same result as would have followed from an
application of the Tax Benefit Rule with a use of the tax rate applicable in the year of deduction. A vigorous dissent would have classified the recovery as income and used the tax rate of the year of
recovery. Although the transactional approach gave a more equitable
result, the Internal Revenue Service felt Perry conflicted with judicial
authority and refused to follow the decision.' 6 The status of the law
regarding the applicable tax rate for recovered deductions became
confused in 1961, when the Court of Claims held 17 that the rate current in the year of recovery is applied to recoveries under the
statutory tax benefit rule of section 111 of the Code (that is, to
recoveries of bad debts, prior taxes, or delinquency amounts).
In determining the proper tax treatment to be given to a recovered
charitable contribution, which had been the subject of prior taxsaving deductions, the court in the instant case identified the problem
as identical to that in Perry v. United States. 8 The court recognized
as "well engrained in our tax law" the principle that a gift of property,
once taken as an income tax deduction, must be treated as income in
the year of recovery.19 Since the instant recovery had caused full
tax deductions, the court concluded that the entire recovery must be
included in current gross income. In solving the question of which
tax rate was applicable-the rate at time of deduction or at time of
recovery-the annualization approach of Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks
Co.20 was followed. The Court of Claims felt that our tax system
demands not only that income be determined without consideration
of losses sustained in earlier years, but also that it be taxed without
reference to the rates in those years. Because of the absence of
specific statutory permission to do otherwise, the court overruled the
Perry decision and applied the tax rate of the year of recoupment to
the entire recovery.
The decision reached in the instant case was admitted by its author
to have produced a "harsh and inequitable result."2' Although the
16. Rev. Rul. 59-141, 1959-1 Cum. BuILL. 17. See also 1 J. MEaRT-s, LAw OF
§ 7.37 (1962).
17. Citizens Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 290 F.2d 932, 937 (Ct. CI.
1961).
18. 381 F.2d at 400.
19. 381 F.2d at 401.
20. 282 U.S. 359 (1931).
21. 381 F.2d at 403, n.5.
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Court of Claims felt a necessity for specific statutory authorization
before it could render a different verdict, there are compelling arguments that the judiciary possesses the power to render a more
equitable conclusion. The court could have taken a less restrictive
approach, emphasizing the congressional purpose in originally permitting the deduction. However, by requiring more taxes upon recovery than the tax benefit derived by the deduction, the instant
decision seems to have defeated the statutory purpose of encouraging
gifts to charity by allowing such tax deductions. This result is caused
by two factors: the tax rate in recovery year is higher than in deduction year, and the taxpayer may be forced into a higher tax bracket by
recouping in one year what was deducted in several. Also, the nature
and development of the Tax Benefit Rule itself is contrary to such an
inequitable conclusion. The general principle requiring taxation of
recoveries previously deducted was to prevent unjust enrichment of
the taxpayer. The judicially-designed Tax Benefit Rule was originated
to mitigate harsh consequences where the deduction had caused
no benefit. Therefore, judges should continue to enforce the Tax
Benefit Rule so as to avoid inequitable conclusions, even if this
requires applying the tax rate of the deduction year. The annualization concept of taxation is not such a rigid principle as to require the
result in this case. By looking to other years to determine whether
the deduction actually caused a tax savings and should be counted
22
as income, the Tax Benefit Rule itself modifies the annual concept.
Moreover, the silence of section 111 on the applicable tax rate is no
bar to this action by the courts. It is true that Congress did not
expressly grant requests that taxes upon recovery be limited to the
dollar amount of taxes saved by the deduction,- but Congress also
ignored pleas to include areas other than bad debts, taxes, and delinquency amounts in section 111.24 The Supreme Court was not
deterred from declaring that the judge-made Tax Benefit Rule applied
to areas other than those enumerated in section 111.25 The complete
silence of the statute regarding the applicable tax rate is a stronger
argument that courts can exercise their discretion, as the Perry court
did. However, if this problem is left to Congress, that body could
and should provide a remedy. A provision for returned contributions
similar to that created for treating unconstitutional federal taxes
returned or cancelled 26 is one possibility. It gives the taxpayer an
22. See authorities cited in notes 6 and 7 supra.
23. Hearings on Revenue Revision of 1942 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1422-23, 1784, 1802 (1942). This legislation was the origin of
what is now § 111.
24. Id. at 706, 1499-1500, 2145-46.
25. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 506 (1943).
26. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 1346.
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option to treat the prior deduction as erroneous and the recovery as
non-taxable if he consents to a deficiency assessment for the prior
year. An alternative would be legislation requiring a solution such
as that arrived at in the Perry decision. Similar treatment has been
given to recoveries caused by mistaken belief in another's claim of
27
right.
27. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1342.

